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Works discussing the experience of combatants, based on their writings or on oral testimony, 
are a well-established genre of military history.
1
 However, it is rare to find authors explicitly 
analysing the various influences that shaped the soldier’s experience in any era. This article, 
which forms part of a wider study of British and Dominion soldiers in the two world wars,
 2
 
attempts to fill this gap by using the Gallipoli campaign as a vehicle to examine some of the 
factors that shaped the experience of British, Australian and New Zealand soldiers that served 
at the Dardanelles. Here, ‘experience’ is defined as ‘the process or an instance of undergoing 
and being affected by an event or a series of connected events’.
3
 Such an exploration helps to 
reveal the extent to which individuals in war have ‘agency’, the ability to determine their own 
fate, or are limited by external factors (in sociological terms, ‘structural constraints’).
4
  Such 
external factors could stem from apparently trivial things, which nevertheless determined a 
man’s fate. In September 1914 Philip Ibbetson and his mate Jack tried to join the Royal 
Australian Navy in Brisbane, but Jack was rejected because of hammer toes. Both men then 
enlisted in the Australian Imperial Force (AIF), which was evidently less fussy about 
recruits’ feet. They eventually found themselves at Gallipoli, rather than experiencing a 
rather different war at sea.
5
 In their case, agency was noticeably absent.  
 
                                                      
1 The classic example is John Keegan, The Face of Battle (London, Jonathan Cape, 1976). Richard Holmes, 
Redcoat: The British Soldier in the Age of Horse and Musket (London: HarperCollins, 2001), is a particularly 
good example. Martin Middlebrook’s books are among the earliest and best examples of the ‘oral history’ 
genre; see e.g. his The First Day on the Somme (London: Allen Lane, 1971).  
2 Civilian Armies: The Experience of British and Dominion Soldiers 1914-45, forthcoming from Yale University 
Press. A small amount of material has previously been published in my contribution to Michael LoCicero (ed.), 
Two Sides of the Same Bad Penny: Gallipoli and the Western Front, A Comparison (Solihull: Helion, 2017). I 
am grateful to Dr LoCicero for his permission to re-use it.  
3 This definition is influenced by those in The Shorter English Dictionary (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1973) and at http://www.dictionary.com/browse/experience (viewed 23 January 2017).  
4  Nicholas Abercromby, Stephen Hill and Bryan S. Turner, The Penguin Dictionary of Sociology (London: 
Penguin, 2006 [1984]), p.9. 
5 Ts memoir, Ibbetson papers, ANZAC (AUST), Ibbetson PL, Item 1, Liddle Collection, University of Leeds. 
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The historiography of the Gallipoli campaign (April 1915-January 1916), abounds in 
‘bottom-up’, soldier-oriented studies. C.E.W. Bean’s monumental Australian official history 
relentlessly focused on the ordinary ‘digger’, in the process doing much to shape the Anzac 
myth.
6
 In the 1970s, Bill Gammage was Beanian in his seminal study of First World War 
Australian soldiers, while Peter Liddle took a broader international approach in his work on 
the Gallipoli experience. 
7
  More recently Nigel Steel, Peter Hart, Terry Kinloch, Stephen 
Chambers and Richard van Emden, among others, have concentrated on the experience of 
low-ranking participants in their books on Gallipoli. 
8
 Glyn Harper devoted a substantial 
section of his fine 2015 study of the New Zealand soldier in the Great War to the Gallipoli 
experience, and in the same year Peter Stanley produced an excellent and highly original 
study of Indian soldiers on the Peninsula.
9
  This article builds on such work to take the 
discussion in a different direction. 
 
The experience of British and Anzac soldiers at Gallipoli is a huge subject, and within the 
narrow compass of this article analysis is limited to three key factors: environmental and 
medical aspects, and the development of trench warfare. However, one external factor above 
all others set the conditions within which soldiers would experience the war. This was the 
decision to launch an offensive at the Dardanelles at a particular time and under particular 
conditions. An officer arriving in theatre in July 1915, by which time the Gallipoli campaign 
was clearly deadlocked at the cost of huge losses to the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force 
(MEF), was told that ‘someone was terribly to blame, and the Army think it is Winston 
[Churchill].  If Winston was to put his foot near the peninsula I believe he would be scragged 
alive’.
10
 This view was a backhanded recognition of the role that strategic decision-makers 
                                                      
6 C.E.W. Bean, The Story of Anzac, 2 volumes (St. Lucia, QLD, University of Queensland Press, 1981 [1921 & 
1924]). There is a substantial literature on Bean. For a sample, see Jenny Macleod, Gallipoli (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2015), pp.69-72 and E.M. Andrews, ‘Bean and Bullecourt: Weaknesses and Strengths of the 
Official History of Australia in the First World War’, in Peter Dennis et al, (eds.), Review Internationale 
d’Histoire Militaire No.72 (Canberra, 1990), pp.25-47. 
7 Bill Gammage, The Broken Years: Australian Soldiers in the Great War (Canberra: Australian National 
University Press, 1974); Peter Liddle, Men of Gallipoli: The Dardanelles and Gallipoli Experience August 1914 
to January 1916 (London: Allen Lane, 1976). For links between Bean and Gammage, see Carolyn Holbrook, 
Anzac: The Unauthorised Biography (Sydney: NewSouth, 2014), pp.129-34. 
8 Nigel Steel and Peter Hart, Defeat at Gallipoli (London: Macmillan, 1994); Peter Hart, Gallipoli (London: 
Profile, 2011); Terry Kinloch, Echoes of Gallipoli: In the Words of New Zealand’s Mounted Riflemen 
(Auckland: Exisle, 2005); Stephen Chambers and Richard van Emden, Gallipoli: The Dardanelles Disaster in 
Soldiers' Words and Photographs (London: Bloomsbury, 2015). 
9 Glyn Harper, Johnny Enzed: The New Zealand Soldier in the First World War (Auckland: Exisle, 2015); Peter 
Stanley, Die in Battle. Don Not Despair: The Indians on Gallipoli, 1915 (Solihull: Helion, 2015). 
10 C.J.L. Allanson, diary, 20 July 1915, in Harry Davies (ed.), Allanson of the 6th, (Worcester: Square One, 
1990), p.26.  
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played in shaping the character of the campaign that soldiers had to endure. Both the initial 
naval operations at the Dardanelles and the subsequent launching of the land campaign at 
Gallipoli were based on a fundamental misjudgement of Ottoman morale and resilience. The 
‘Turks’ were judged by recent poor combat performances, as well as racial stereotyping, and 
were wrongly viewed as a grossly inferior foe which would not put up much of a fight.  
 
Given this underlying assumption, the slapdash planning and inadequate resourcing of the 
land campaign becomes explicable, if not excusable.
11
 Moreover this explains the rationale 
behind the dispatch of force consisting of raw Australians, New Zealanders, British 
Territorial and Kitchener’s Army divisions, and the hastily improvised Royal Naval Division 
(RND), stiffened by the Regular (but ad hoc) 29
th
 Division, all without their full complement 







The climate on the Gallipoli peninsula in summer was broadly similar to that of Melbourne, 
thus many Australians would have been used to such conditions.
13
 Men coming from New 
Zealand and the UK were not so fortunate. For Englishmen, summer temperatures at 
Gallipoli would, at home, have been regarded as a ‘heat wave’.
14
 Regular units of the 29
th
 
Division came from stations in places such as India, Burma and Mauritius, so many of the 
soldiers would already have been familiar with hot weather. For some troops that were 
dispatched from the British Isles, such as those of the Territorial Force 42
nd
 (East Lancashire) 
Division, there was the chance to acclimatise while undergoing extensive training in Egypt. 
By contrast, most of the Kitchener volunteers of 10
th
 (Irish) Division sailed from England in 
                                                      
11For the inadequacies of British planning, see Robin Prior, Gallipoli: The End of the Myth (New Haven and 
London: Yale University Press, 2010 [2009]).  
12 For modern assessments of the Ottoman forces, see Edward J. Erickson, Ottoman Military Effectiveness in 
World War I: A Comparative Study (Abingdon: Routledge, 2007); Harvey Broadbent, Defending Gallipoli: The 
Turkish Story (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 2015).  
13 Taranaki Daily News (NZ), 19 Oct. 1915, p.7; Peter Chasseaud and Peter Doyle, Grasping Gallipoli 
(Staplehurst: Spellmount, 2005), p.4; Jessie Birkett-Rees, ‘Capturing the battlefield: mapping and air 
photography at Gallipoli’ in Antonio Sagona et al (eds.), Anzac Battlefield: A Gallipoli Landscape of War and 
Memory (Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 2016), pp.60; http://1914-
1918.invisionzone.com/forums/index.php?/topic/195862-gallipoli-weather-stats/, viewed 3 Feb. 2017. 
14 Michael J. Mortlock, The Landings at Suvla Bay, 1915 (Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 2007), p.49. 
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early July 1915, and after a brief stop in Egypt was committed to battle at Suvla Bay about a 




The heat was one of the major characteristics of the experience of men at Gallipoli. A 
comment of a Regular officer of 1/Borders (which had been previously stationed in Burma) is 
representative: ‘Life… became very irksome… Little shade was available anywhere and 
one’s “dug out” during the heat of the day became a veritable Turkish Bath’.
16
 The inevitable 
result of troops from the British Isles campaigning in a Mediterranean summer climate was, 
as a corporal of 1/5 Manchesters wrote, ‘the exposure… caused all the skin on our faces to 
peel off’.
17
 In the hot weather, to varying extents, conventions of uniform were relaxed, 
although an Royal Marine Light Infantry [RMLI] officer complained that, in early June, they 
were ‘still wearing our thick serge tunics, breeches and puttees’.
18
  Australians and New 
Zealanders seem to have gone the furthest, reducing clothing to the bare minimum of ‘shorts, 




The problems of operating in what was, for many, an unfamiliar and enervating climate were 
exacerbated by a chronic lack of water. Failures in planning and logistics were exacerbated 
by ‘shallowly buried’ corpses polluting available water supplies. Moreover, the saltiness of 
one of the staples of the soldiers’ diet, bully beef, one man wrote, ‘made us twice as 
thirsty’.
20
 The shortage of water became a major scandal, the subject of an entire section in 
the Report of the Dardanelles Commission. This was mostly devoted to Suvla, where 
operations were materially impeded by shortage of water, 
21
 although it briefly discussed the 
situation at Anzac, stating that the water ‘supply seems to have been barely sufficient’. Of 
Helles, the report stated that ‘a moderate supply of water’ was found and ‘subsequently there 
                                                      
15 Stair Gillon, The Story of the 29th Division (London: Nelson, 1925) pp. 4-5; K.W. Mitchinson, The Territorial 
Force at War, 1914-1916 (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), p.89; Bryan Cooper, The Tenth (Irish) 
Division at Gallipoli (Blackrock: Irish Academic Press, 1992 [1918], pp.35, 38. 
16 A.J. Ellis, ts memoir, p.42, B[order] R[egiment] A[rchives], C[umbria’s] M[useum] of M[ilitary] L[ife].  
17 Cpl. Cyril Barnes to Flo, 16 May 1915, MR3/16/56, M[anchester] R[egiment Archives], T[ameside] L[ocal] 
S[tudies] and A[rchives] C[entre]. 
18 A.R. Chater, ms memoir, p.10, CHATER 1/2, L[iddell] H[art] C[entre] for M[ilitary] A[rchives]. 
19 A.A. McQueen, ts memoir, p.14, Acc. No.1991.381, K[ippenberger] M[ilitary] A[rchive, N[ational] A[rmy] 
M[useum] N[ew] Z[ealand]. 
20 Lord Rochdale, statement to Dardanelles Commission, CAB 19/29, T[he] N[atonal] A[rchives]; Cecil and 
Douglas Gunning, ts diary, 3 Jan. 1916, RDFA/018/1/3, R[oyal] D[ublin] F[usiliers] A[ssociation] Archive, 
D[ublin] C[ity] A[rchives]. 
21 Rhys Crawley, Climax at Gallipoli: The Failure of the August Offensive (Norman, OK: University of 
Oklahoma Press, 2014), pp.181-82; J.M. Heath, diary, 8, 11 Aug. 1915, CAB 45/253, TNA. 
 5 
does not appear to have been any difficulty with the supply’.
22
 The latter comment was too 
sanguine. While the situation might have been better than in the other sectors, there was 
never enough drinking water at Helles.
23 
 
If heat and the sun posed problems for soldiers at Gallipoli, so did cold nights and occasional 
rain. The unpleasant situation of living in very primitive trenches at the beginning of the 
campaign was worsened by the fact that for some time troops had little more than they stood 
up in. The New Zealand sapper who wrote on 1 May that ‘We have no blankets or waterproof 
sheets here yet so it’s a bit cold and wet at times’ spoke for many other soldiers in a similar 
predicament.
24
 Lacking any overhead covering, wearing wet clothes was an occupational 
hazard.
25
 However, it was the ‘sharp and biting’
26
 winter weather that affected troops on 
Gallipoli the worst. A blizzard on 26 November 1915 caused widespread suffering.
27
 Some of 
the severest conditions occurred at Suvla. Here, trenches were still fairly primitive, and many 
soldiers and officers were inexperienced. A Territorial battalion, 1/1 Herefords, was flooded 
out of their trenches by the blizzard and spent the night in the open, in the snow. The sheer 
misery snapped the fragile bonds of discipline, and men looted some rum: ‘The effect on 
empty stomachs and in that cold was simply devastating. Filled with a spurious warmth’ men 
lay down and even undressed. NCOs and officers were unable to impose order or perhaps 




This episode illustrates the impact of extreme weather on the experience of the soldiers, 
which was exacerbated by primitive trenches, and infrastructure that was all but non-existent; 
if the men had been withdrawn to a hutted or even tented camp, with facilities for hot food 
and to change into dry clothes, things might have been very different. As it was, these civilian 
                                                      
22 The Final Report of the Report of the Dardanelles Commission, Part II, (Cmd. 371) 1917, pp.62. 
23 A.E.F. Fawcus, statement to Dardanelles Commission, CAB 19/29, TNA; Murray, diary, 19, 20 July 1915, in 
Joseph Murray, Gallipoli 1915 (London: New English Library, 1977 [1965]), p.123; F.L. Morrison, The Fifth 
Battalion the Highland Light Infantry in the War, 1914-1918 (Hamburg: Tredition 2013 [1921]), pp.33, 45. For 
the collection of ground water and use of wells, see Gibbon, 42nd Division, pp. 25-26.  
24 Arthur Bellingham, diary, 1 May 1915, Acc.1991.2731, KMA/NAMNZ. 
25 Claude Worthington diary, 13 May 1915, in Robert Bonner (ed.), Great Gable to Gallipoli (Knutsford: Fleur 
de Lys, 2004), p. 18.  
26 James Brassell to brother, 20 Oct. 1915, in Maitland Weekly Mercury (NSW), 1 Jan. 1916, p.3. 
27 See e.g. Tom Rumsey to Mr. Williams, 12 Dec. 1915, in Brecon & Radnor Express,13 Jan. 1916, p.2, H. 
Maldwyn Davies, A Flintshire Territorial at War (Bridge Books, Worthernbury, 2016), pp.60-1.  
28 26-28 Nov. 1915, & Appx. 2 to Nov. 1915, W[ar] D[iary], 1/1 Herefords, WO 95/4323, TNA; Capt. Peter 
Ashton, diary, 26-28 November 1915, quoted in T.J.B. Hill, Manu Forti: A History of the Herefordshire 
Regiment 1860-1967 (Stroud: Alan Sutton, 1996), pp.46-48. 
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soldiers’ powers of endurance were pushed beyond what they could endure. Perhaps the 
surprising thing was that at Gallipoli, such occurrences were not more frequent.  
 
As in in all military campaigns, the soldiers' experience was materially shaped by the ground 
over which they fought. 
29
 The terrain affected the experience of the troops from the first 
moments of the land campaign. When Major-General Hunter-Weston recorded that his 29
th
 
Division had landed on 25 April and overcome strong defences manned by entrenched 
Ottoman infantry which had considerable fire-support, he glossed over the very different 
situations faced by assault troops on different beaches, which included lightly- and 
unopposed landings. 
30
 After the failure of the Helles force to break through at the First Battle 
of Krithia (28 April), the front solidified. The Ottomans made excellent defensive use of the 
terrain, and had the advantage of holding high ground. As a British officer wrote, ‘The worst 
part of the fighting was the rough nature of the ground, and the thorough concealment of the 
enemy's trenches and positions. The ground was perfect for defence, being a mass of nullahs 
and ravines'.
31
 Achi Baba, the objective of so many Allied attacks, gave Ottoman artillery 
observers superb views over the MEF’s positions. At Suvla, the terrain, a plain overlooked by 
high ground which was held by the Ottomans, also favoured the defenders. 
 
The initial landings at Anzac Cove confronted the assaulting Australians and later New 
Zealanders with formidable heights and extremely broken terrain, which contributed to a loss 
of cohesion in the advance of these green troops, which were later driven back. This left the 
Anzacs, ‘in a most annoying, not to say humiliating, position… We have only a cheese-bite 
out of the cliffs – a little more than 2 miles along (sic), with a perimeter of defence of 2¾ 
miles & a depth in its widest part of ¾ mile’.
32
  The terrain at Anzac played a critical part in 
moulding the experience of the men who fought there. Ottoman trenches were in many places 
very close to those held by the Anzacs, and there was no scope for tactical withdrawal. 
Quinn’s Post was under more-or-less permanent attack, often with grenades being thrown in 
an attempt to render it untenable. However, the retention of Quinn’s was critical to the 
survival of the beachhead, for it offered a direct route into the heart of the Anzac position via 
                                                      
29 Peter Doyle and Matthew R. Bennett, ‘Military Geography: The Influence of Terrain on the Outcome of the 
Gallipoli Campaign, 1915’, Geographical Journal, 165, 1. (Mar. 1999).  
30 Hunter-Weston to Wigram, 6 May 1915, Hunter-Weston papers, 6503-9-21, National Army Museum.  
31 Ellis, memoir, p.36, BRA/CMML. 
32 Godley to Rawlinson, 23 July 1915, Maurice papers, MAURICE 3/4/16, LHCMA. 
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Monash Valley. Thus a series of Australian and New Zealand units underwent some of the 






Faith in medical arrangements is often cited as an important factor in maintaining military 
morale.
34
 Many soldiers at Gallipoli found the medical facilities to be grossly defective. 
During the initial planning for the campaign, General Sir Ian Hamilton and his staff had 
failed to involve medical officers, and casualties were grossly underestimated.
35
 As a result, 
medical facilities were poorly organised and inadequately resourced, and were rapidly 
overwhelmed, unlike on the Western Front, where ‘medical services reached a level of 
efficiency and sophistication unprecedented in British military history’.
36
 These failures of 
planning played an important and baleful role in shaping the experience of soldiers at the 
Dardanelles. 
 
The importance of hygiene and sanitation was fully recognised by the Army. Field Service 
Regulations (1909) presciently stated that ‘Neglect of sanitary precautions inevitably result in 
great loss of life and efficiency’, and the Manual of Field Engineering stated that ‘5 [latrine] 
trenches should be provided for 100 men for 1 day’.
37
 However these manuals did not 
envisage a situation where a sizable force was cooped up in a small area, in which latrines 
had to compete with many other things such as supply dumps and field hospitals. Under these 
conditions, the ideal very quickly went by the board. Furthermore, latrine building was 




                                                      
33 Frank McKenzie, ts diary, 2 June 1915, Acc.1999.571, KMA/NAMNZ; Peter Stanley, Quinn’s Post, Anzac, 
Gallipoli (Crow’s Nest, NSW, Allen & Unwin, 2005). 
34 e.g. Karen S. Vogt, ‘Origins of Military Medical Care as an Essential Source of Morale’, Military Medicine, 
180, 6, p.604.  
35 Mark Harrison, The Medical War: British Military Medicine in the First World War (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2010). Hamilton privately admitted that some medical aspects suffered from ‘insufficiency of 
preparation’: Hamilton to Babtie, 22 Jan. 1917, Hamilton papers 8/1/17, LHCMA.  See also Michael Tyquin, 
Gallipoli: The Medical War (Kensington, NSW: New South Wales University Press, 1993), p.82. 
36 Harrison, Medical War, p.171. For Gallipoli, see Chapter 3. 
37 Field Service Regulations Part I (HMSO, 1909), pp.69, 83-84; Manual of Field Engineering (HMSO, 1911), 
pp. 57-58. 
38 Babtie to Hamilton, 26 Jan. 1917, Hamilton papers 8/1/7, LHCMA. Babtie was quoting his submission to the 
Dardanelles Commission: see Cmd. 371, pp.158-59. 
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Problems of sanitation were exacerbated by the fact that at least some troops had not been 
trained in the basics of hygiene.
39
 Men from impoverished civilian backgrounds who had 
dwelt in insalubrious dwellings, may, in any case, have had low levels of hygiene.
40
 The 
Regimental Medical Officer of 2/Royal Fusiliers devised a sanitation system for the trenches 
and in July instructed the RMOs of two newly-arrived units of 13
th
 Division. He was not 
impressed: ‘K[itchener’s] Army seems to have a jolly poor idea of sanitation!!!’
41
 Men were 
supposed to use latrines on the beaches, but because of the sheer practicalities of actually 
getting to the latrines, especially when suffering bowel disorders, and the fact that the 
beaches were under fire, ‘men frequently did not use the places set aside’.
42
 In any case, 
shallowly-dug latrines ‘were quite useless’.
43
 All this helped create a vicious circle, in which 
unburied faeces led to diseases such as diarrhoea and dysentery, resulting in yet more 
untreated excrement. So it came to be that the ground was covered with human excrement – 
or, as one writer euphemistically commented about Helles, ‘the whole earth soon became 




Even the most fastidious soldier found maintaining personal cleanliness extremely taxing, 
especially since water was so difficult to obtain. Cyril Barnes, a middle-class corporal of 1/5 
Manchesters, noted that at a rest camp he had his first wash for six days and he ‘washed a 
pair of socks & a shirt & a singlet which I have been wearing for a month’.
45
 Some washed 
their clothes in the sea.
46
 Sea bathing was a popular, if risky pastime, for just as on land, 
swimmers were not immune from enemy shells and bullets.
47
 Other factors contributed to 
disease, including the fouling of drinking water (see above), and ‘dead bodies in hundreds 
decaying all around the trenches [i.e. in no man’s land]’. 
48
 Such unburied remains had often 
been there for some time.  The resulting stench was frequently mentioned by eyewitnesses.
49
 
                                                      
39 Harrison, Medical War, pp. 177, 199.  
40 Leonore Davidoff, ‘The Family in Britain’, in F.M.L. Thompson (ed.), The Cambridge Social History of 
Britain 1750-1950, Vol. II, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), p.123. 
41 George Pirie, diary, 14, 27, 29 July 1915, in Michael Lucas (ed.), Front Line Medic – Gallipoli, Somme, Ypres 
(Solihull: Helion, 2014), pp. 60, 63, 64. 
42 C.M. Begg, NZMC, statement to Dardanelles Commission, CAB 19/28, TNA. 
43 Leonard S. Dudgeon, ‘Personal Experiences on the Gallipoli Peninsula’, Proceedings of the Royal Society of 
Medicine, 9, (1916) p.110. 
44 John Buchan, The History of the Royal Scots Fusiliers (1678-1918) (London: Nelson, 1925), p.335. 
45 Barnes to Flo, 28 May 1915, MR3/16/56, MRA/TLSAC. 
46 Lee to mother, 29 Aug. 1915, in Lee, Letters, pp.41.  
47 Cecil Malthus, Anzac: A Retrospect (Auckland, NZ: Reed, 2002) [1965]), p.82. 
48 Tyquin, Gallipoli, p. 112; Harrison, Medical War, p.196; Pte. John Brassell to John Brassell, 5 Oct. 1916, in 
Maitland Weekly Mercury (NSW), 1 Jan. 1916, p.3.  
49 e.g. McQueen, memoir, p.13, Acc. No.1991.381, KMA/NAMNZ; Simpson-Baikie to wife, 16 Jun 1915, 
Simpson-Baikie papers, LHCMA. 
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Swarms of flies were a particular trial. A soldier of 7/Royal Dublin Fusiliers wrote from 
Suvla in mid-September that ‘the flies seem to increase every day, there certainly didn't seem 





There were 10,383 admissions to hospital of British (not including Dominion) soldiers 
suffering from diarrhoea, (a figure that certainly underestimates the number of cases), a ratio 
of 88.69 per 1,000 troops on the ration strength, 
51
 and 29,728 admissions for dysentery and 
811 deaths, or a ratio of 253.94 and 6.93 per thousand respectively.
52
 Anzacs were also badly 
affected by these diseases.
53
 Tellingly, Private Fred Morgan’s death was announced in his 
local newspaper under the heading of ‘Another Harfat Lad Succumbs to Dysentery’.
54
 
Medical staff themselves were not immune from sickness, and this further reduced the 
effectiveness of already inadequate medical provision.
55
 Thus, a major factor shaping the 
distinctive experience of troops at Gallipoli was widespread suffering from diarrhoea and 




The debilitating impact of diarrhoea and dysentery made enduring campaign conditions, and 
performing military duties effectively, much more difficult. Many historians have identified 
poor health of the troops as an ingredient in the failure of the August Offensive,
57
 but in truth 
many soldiers on the Peninsula were unwell for much of the campaign. Just moving kit from 
the beaches to the front line, or manning a trench, was a trial for a soldier suffering from 
diarrhoea. Sufferers had to make multiple trips to the latrine, sometimes under fire. Padre 
Best of 42
nd
 Division recorded that on one night ‘Eleven times… did I have to bolt for it… 
This is too much – pain and sickness intolerable’.
58
 The effects of diarrhoea and dysentery 
were not just physical; they were also psychological.  
 
                                                      
50 Henry Kavanagh to brother, 16 Sept. 1915, RDFA/0034, RDFA Archive, DCA. 
51 T.J. Mitchell and G.M. Smith, Medical Services: Casualties and Medical Statistics of the Great War (London: 
HMSO, 1931), p.205. 
52 Mitchell and Smith, Medical Services, p.81. 
53 Tyquin, Gallipoli, pp.116-17.  
54 Haverfordwest and Milford Haven Telegraph, 17 Nov. 1915, p.3. (emphasis added).  
55 Eric Hunter and Lesley Oldham, The Manchester Medics (privately published, 2016), p.42. 
56 Mitchell and Smith, Medical Services, p.81. 
57 e.g. Rhys Crawley, Climax at Gallipoli: The Failure of the August Offensive (Norman, OK: University of 
Oklahoma Press, 2014), pp.56-58. 
58 Diary, 21 Sept. 1915, in Gavin Roynon (ed.), A Prayer for Gallipoli: The Great War Diaries of Chaplain 
Kenneth Best (London: Simon and Schuster, 2011 [2012]), p.217. 
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Recent scholarship has pointed to the soldier’s diet being a major factor in ill-health among 
Australian and New Zealand soldiers to Gallipoli. The food provided was ‘nutritionally 
inadequate’ and this contributed to ill-health. Indeed, the very food probably contributed to 
sickness: excessive amounts of fatty food (such as bully beef) is a trigger for diarrhoea. 
Moreover, the monotony of the rations undermined morale.
59
 A (fairly typical) account by an 
Australian soldier of his meals mentioned bully beef, bacon, hardtack biscuit, and the 
occasional onion and potato, and jam. 
60
 Over time, at least at Helles, as the logistics 
improved, so did the quality of the food: a battalion of 52
nd
 Division received ‘frozen meat of 
excellent quality instead of bully’, and biscuits were replaced by ‘good bread’.
61
  At Helles, 
there was limited access to a canteen, which supplied chocolate and cigarettes.
62
 
Nevertheless, the diet was poorly chosen for a hot climate. Although Rachel Duffett has 
convincingly argued that provision of food to the BEF was not without its problems (men 
sometimes went hungry, even when fed were not always satisfied by the fare, and the food 
lacked nourishment) 
63
, by comparison to their counterparts on the Western Front the men at 




Some men were relatively fortunate to be wounded very early on in the initial amphibious 
assault, and were promptly evacuated. 
64
 Other were not so lucky, because ‘evacuation 
arrangements – such as they were – fell into disarray’. Many wounded had to lie on the 
beach, exposed to the glare of the sun and at risk of being wounded again.
65
 Once the front 
had stabilised, a system for evacuation was put into place, but how quickly a wounded man 
was treated was all too often a matter of chance. For instance, Private Harry Askin (RMLI) 
was wounded at Helles on 10 July. He made his way to an aid post in the trenches, to be told 
                                                      
59 Nick Wilson et al, ‘A nutritional analysis of New Zealand military food rations at Gallipoli in 1915: likely 
contribution to scurvy and other nutrient deficiency disorders’, The New Zealand Medical Journal, 126, 1373 
(Apr. 2013), pp.12-29 (quote from p.23); Alison Wishart, ‘“As fit as fiddles” and “as weak as kittens”: the 
importance of food, water and diet to the Anzac campaign at Gallipoli’, First World War Studies, 7:2, (Aug. 
2016), pp.131-64. 
60 Laddie Morris to parents, in Brecon and Radnor Express, 16 Dec. 1915, p.2.  
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that ‘if I could walk at all, I’d better set off as I wouldn’t get a stretcher for hours’. He started 
off for a Field Ambulance, four miles away, but exhausted himself in the process, and only 
made it by being carried by two Good Samaritans in the shape of Australian gunners. 
66
 The 
heat complicated matters, for wounds in hot weather ‘became septic and infest[ed] with 
maggots’ within twenty-four hours. 
67
 Moreover, there was no equivalent of the routine of 
Western Front soldiers in going into 'rest' sufficiently far from the front lines to be out of 
danger. This had an impact on psychiatric casualties: a contemporary argued that almost all 




Once a wounded or sick man had reached a field hospital, he might well still be in great 
danger. Given the lack of depth to each beachhead, and the paucity of cover, medical posts, 
patients and medical staff were continually exposed to enemy fire. The war diarist of a Field 
Ambulance of 52
nd
 (Lowland) Division noted that they were moving to a new site: ‘Not sorry 
to go, as owing to crowded state of ground, & proximity of aerodrome, ordnance stores, R.E. 
Park etc. we were more or less constantly under shell fire’.
69
 The lack of advanced medical 
and surgical facilities on the peninsula mean that many men cases had to be evacuated by sea 
to Lemnos, but with the most severe cases being sent  to Alexandria (48 hours sailing) or 
Malta (55 hours).
70
 The time between a man being wounded or taken ill and reaching hospital 
had obvious implications for their chances of recovery. The conditions in which wounded 
and sick were evacuated were also a matter of chance. They might travel on specialist 
hospital ships, or in much less salubrious conditions. One incident, involving the use of an 
ammunition ship to carry wounded, became notorious.
71
 Soldiers at Gallipoli knew that, if 
they were wounded or became seriously ill, a harrowing period lay ahead of them.  
 
The Emergence of Trench Warfare  
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The failure of the landings of 25 April to usher in a swift victory was a critical factor in 
shaping the experience of the soldier at Gallipoli. Brigadier-General Hugh Simpson-Baikie, 
who arrived from the Western Front in May to command 29
th
 Division’s artillery, concluded:  
This campaign has now got into the regular trench warfare as in France. This is 
exactly what I foresaw... would very likely be the case... Progress will therefore be 
very slow & very costly in life & munitions.72  
Major actions were the exception rather than the rule. Once the lines congealed, soldiers had 
to adjust to what one RND officer described as  
the routine of trench warfare… strengthening of defences… constant work on saps… 
of the deepening and traversing of old trenches, and the making of new ones, on the 
construction of strongpoints and machine-gun emplacements.
73
  
This was in addition to holding the line, wiring, carrying out and enduring sniping and 
bombing, enduring shelling, and sometimes attacking enemy positions or repelling attacks. 
At first trenches were primitive, and dangerously shallow, and much labour was expended on 
them.
74
 By July an officer on his first trip to the line marveled that the trenches 'are a 




Under these conditions of trench warfare, soldiers had to learn new skills, and specialised 
units and sub-units were soon organized. ‘Mining’ or ‘tunnelling’ was an integral part of 
trench warfare, as both sides sought to burrow under their opponent’s trenches, pack the 
tunnels with high explosive, and detonate it. On occasions, tunnels would be broken into by 
enemy miners, and there would be fighting below the earth. Both sides also tried to destroy 
the other’s tunnels by firing small countermines. Initially, tunnelling at Helles was carried out 
by infantry under the supervision of trained sappers, some being instructed in classes by 
‘expert miners’. This was regularised in July with the formation of VIII Corps Mining 
Company, which later became part of 254 Tunneling Company, R.E.
76
 At Anzac, specialised 
units were improvised from Australian infantry in late May, in response to developments at 
Quinn’s Post, the most exposed part of the Anzac position. Increasingly, men who had been 
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miners in civilian life were used for this work.
77
 With the passage of time, mining operations 
became more sophisticated and extensive. Miners from 42
nd
 Division and their Ottoman 




The hand grenade, or ‘bomb’, was the quintessential weapon of trench warfare. In short 
supply at the begin of the campaign, bombs were improvised from jam tins until better 
models and eventually, Mills Bombs, became readily available.
79
 Like mining, bombing 
became an increasingly specialized, and bureaucratized, affair. By September 1915, things in 
the bombing world at Helles were changing. Bombing operations were codified, with a 
Bombing School set up. A special ‘Grenadier Badge’ was introduced, and so that it should 
not been seen as ‘too “cheap’”, to earn it men had to undergo a course and pass a test.
80
 Thus 
the experience of some groups of soldiers, as part of the MEF’s response to the development 
of trench warfare, was of increasing specialisation.  
 
Between the extremes of holding trenches and engaging in major assaults, soldiers at 
Gallipoli participated in three types of offensive operations. The first was patrolling by night 
in No Man’s Land. While patrols on the Western Front were often intended to dominate No 
Man’s Land, it seems that on Gallipoli the usual purpose of patrolling was to reconnoitre; 
thus one patrol, tellingly described as being composed of ‘scouts’ of 1/8 Manchesters, located 
concealed enemy machine-guns.
81
  Patrolling seems to have been carried out on an ad hoc 




The second type of action was the raid, a small-scale ‘hit and run’ offensive, which did not 
aim at capturing and retaining ground. Successful raids were intended to ‘dispirit the enemy 
and [keep] him in a state of apprehension’, and to keep up the MEF’s offensive spirit. 
83
 On 
the Western Front raids were to become staple of the infantryman’s experience, but at 
Gallipoli they were relatively infrequent. According to the Divisional History, 42
nd
 Division’s 
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first raid was carried by six volunteers commanded by Second-Lieutenant Bennet Burleigh 
(1/7 Lancashire Fusiliers) around 18 June 1915. Bennet Burleigh’s presence in the front-line 
is confirmed by the Battalion’s war diary, but the raid is not mentioned, suggesting that it was 
carried out on his own initiative. This contrasts with a carefully-planned raid on the night of 
15/16 December, when a party destroyed an Ottoman mine head. These two raids, carried out 
six months apart by the same battalion, perhaps indicates the way that the soldiers’ 
experience had changed. Just as was the case on the Western Front, trench warfare had 
become increasingly bureaucratised.
84
 The freelance style of raiding and patrolling of the 
summer had given way to a more methodical approach, as indicated by the previous 




The final category of action was the ‘minor enterprise’. These were divided into stand-alone 
actions, and operations in support of activities elsewhere. At Helles early as 9 May Hunter-
Weston ordered 29
th
 Division to ‘maintain “a ceaseless initiative” by means of local 
advances’. This continued to be the mantra of high commanders.
86
 The objective was to 
expand the beachhead by pushing the line forward. Such operations were also carried out at 
Anzac. At Helles, the RND pushed forward about 800 yards in four advances by night in 
May, for under 50 casualties. By contrast, as Ottoman defences improved, all too often these 
minor enterprises, even if successful, developed into small-scale attritional actions that were 
very costly in casualties. The RND assaulted and captured an Ottoman trench on 19 June, but 
this precipitated a battle that stretched out over three days. Eventually the RND cut its losses 
and left the trench in Turkish hands.
87
 Such costly operations formed the backdrop to many a 
soldier’s time at Gallipoli.  
 
There were several ways in which soldiers’ experience at the Dardanelles differed from that 
of their equivalents in France. Enemy artillery bombardments were much heavier on the 
Western Front, and battle casualties were higher. 
88
 British high command feared that the 
Ottomans would use chemical weapons, but in the event poison gas was a horror endured by 
                                                      
84 Tony Ashworth, Trench Warfare 1914-1918 (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1980), pp. 56-75. 
85 Gibbon, 42nd Division, pp.42, 55-56; 1/7 Manchesters, WD, 17 June, 16 Dec. 1915, WO 95/4315, TNA.  
86 e.g. Lt.-Gen. Davies: ‘more small offensive operations must be undertaken’, Corps Commanders conference, 
2 Sept. 1915, VIII Corps GS WD, WO 95/4273, TNA. 
87 Jerrold, RND, pp.139-41. 
88 C.E.W. Bean, The Australian Imperial Force in France, Vol. III (St. Lucia, QLD, University of Queensland 
Press, 1982 [1929]), 218; Prior, Gallipoli, p.243. 
 15 
soldiers in France but not by men at the Dardanelles.
89
 Compared to the Western Front, the 
level of Central Powers’ air activity at Gallipoli was low. Soldiers’ letters and diaries often 
mention seeing enemy aeroplanes, and sometimes the dropping of bombs, but this was never 
much more than an irritant.
90
 The Gallipoli campaign took place too early in the conflict for 
aircraft attacking ground targets to become a major feature of the soldiers’ experience.   
 
In some ways trench warfare on Gallipoli was actually worse that the equivalent in Flanders. 
‘The officers & men here have a much harder time in every way than in France’, wrote an 
officer who fought in both theatres. At Gallipoli, 'the troops never get any Rest. In France 
when they come out of the trenches they go to houses far removed from shell fire. Here they 
go to Rabbit holes’ - 'infantry !!!! Rest !!!! Camps'.
91
 All of this ensured that the soldier's 
predominant experience of Gallipoli was one of attritional, trench-bound warfare. The Allies 
were pinned into two small beachheads which could only be expanded at the margins, if at 
all. This had the important consequence that almost everywhere on the Peninsula was 
exposed to enemy fire. Lieutenant-General Sir Francis ‘Joey’ Davies, who took command of 
VIII Corps at Helles in August, stated that ‘I do not know of a single yard that was safe from 
shell fire’, and it was much the same at Anzac and Suvla.
92
 Enemy rifle fire was also a 
constant hazard, even in the rear areas.
93
 Behind the front space for camps, hospitals, supply 
dumps, headquarters and the like was at a premium. The opening of a third front at Suvla 
provided a bigger beachhead with a larger hinterland, but otherwise the same constraints 
applied. 
 
The factors that underpinned the stalemate were much the same as those that applied in 
Flanders. At the operational level, the trenches at Helles had secure flanks, so every assault 
had to be made frontally; only once was an amphibious hook attempted. At Anzac the 
extremely difficult terrain proved a formidable barrier to a flank attack. Tactical factors 
included the fact that when protected even by rudimentary trenches, stubborn defending 
infantry and machine gunners proved difficult to neutralise sufficiently to allow attacks to 
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make progress. Moreover, counter-battery fire was embryonic and largely ineffective. 
Therefore, attacking across No Man's Land was invariably costly and rarely achieved much; 
the Ottomans were no more able to break through strongly-held trenches than were the 
British or Anzacs. The experience of battle (as opposed to merely holding trenches, albeit 
under fire) for the most part took the form of bloody, attritional combat, with the same piece 
of ground being fought over time and again. At Helles, in July 1915, a soldier cursed the 
‘haunted’ Achi Baba Nullah: ‘This miserable piece of scrubland has been paid for over and 





Another significant problem, in Flanders as well as at the Dardanelles, was inadequate 
command and control. The absence of reliable communications greatly reduced the ability of 
higher commanders to influence operations once they had been committed to battle. Planning 
of operations was often poor, and matched by the problems in disseminating orders. 
1/Borders received its instructions on 28 April, shortly before an attack was to take place, 
‘and it was practically impossible for everyone to understand in a hurry from a map the exact 
position we were to reach’.
95
 Perhaps the biggest problem, however, was that the MEF had 
insufficient artillery and ammunition, as astute observers recognised from very early on. 
‘Given plenty of high explosive shells & hand grenades ad lib’, Brigadier-General William 
Marshall (87 Brigade) wrote in early July, ‘there would be none of this delay in getting 
through. Without high explosive (& heaps of it) the task of turning the Turk out of trenches (a 




As with so many other things, decisions taken at the outset of the campaign powerfully 
influenced the soldiers’ experience. On landing on the Peninsula, four divisions of VIII Corps 
should have been equipped with 304 guns, but in fact they had a mere 118, some of which 
were obsolete.
97
 Eventually, the number of guns and howitzers with VIII Corps rose to 123, 
although the bulk of these (84) were 18-pdr field guns rather than heavy weapons; there was 
also 20 obsolescent 15-pdrs. The CO of a counter-battery unit in VIII Corps testified that by 
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October, only four out of a possible ten heavy guns were available are any one time.
98
 Shells, 
as well as guns, were in short supply. In mid-May HQ MEF ordered that the obsolete 15-pdr 
was to be used in place of the 18-pdr ‘where possible’, and even in repelling attacks the 
‘necessity for economy of ammunition’ was to be born in mind.
99
 Naval gunfire support 
proved an inadequate substitute, and in any case this diminished after the arrival of German 




Moreover, the tactical techniques that in 1917-18 were to transform the conduct of operations 
on the Western Front were still being formulated. Looking back, G.B. Hurst (1/7 
Manchesters) recognised that Gallipoli methods were ‘out of date in France in 1917’: 
a vast concentration of gun power, infinitely equipped and munitioned, a scientific 
use of barrage fire, nicely adjusted to the movements of a great infantry force, itself 
organised to develop the fullest use of machine guns, Lewis guns, and grenades, 
would have broken the defences of Achi Baba. Our army knew none of these 
advantages… It was realised nowhere at this period that the rôle of infantry in attack 
is quite secondary to that of the guns’.
101
  
He might have added a virtually insuperable problem, that opportunities for training on the 
Peninsula were limited at best. An officer recorded that ‘training of any kind was impossible 






Part of the soldier’s experience at Gallipoli was the process of learning collectively and by 
individuals. Some of this was simply becoming battlewise. The decision of a battalion 
commander to remove badges of rank and dress as an Other Rank for fear of snipers is one 
example of this. 
103
 Units sent as reinforcements to the Dardanelles at least had an 
opportunity to prepare themselves. Officers of 1/5 HLI obtained, apparently before they 
landed at Gallipoli in June, copies of Notes on Trench Warfare in France, and later they 
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borrowed the Trench Standing Orders of 2/Royal Fusiliers.
104
 There was also a tactical 
learning process. In May, Forward Observation Officers, who liaised between the artillery 
and infantry, were introduced into 29
th
 Division. Aircraft spotted targets for the guns, albeit 
that this was ‘never entirely satisfactory’ during the Gallipoli campaign.
 105
 ‘Joey’ Davies 
introduced cutting-edge practices into VIII Corps from the Western Front, where he had 
previously commanded the Regular 8
th
 Division; for instance, he personally instigating the 
appointment of a Divisional Bombing Officer and Bombing school to replace the ‘haphazard 




In June-July 1915, the MEF and the French began to use a form of what would become 
known as ‘bite and hold’, that is to launch a strictly limited offensive, with the infantry 
supported by massed artillery. The aim was to take a ‘bite’ out of the enemy’s position, 
which could then be consolidated and held against counterattacks. These methods were 
employed during Third Krithia, 4-6 June 1915. GHQ’s orders specified that until the enemy 
front line was ‘thoroughly secured no further advance will be made, but as soon as this has 
been done every opportunity of gaining further ground will be seized, the advance being 
made step by step with the conversion and consolidation of the successive positions gained’. 
The Allies achieved an advance of some 500 yards, inflicting 9,000 casualties on the 
Ottomans, and suffering some 6,500. 
107
 In other circumstances this would have been 
advantageous to the Allies, as was the case on the Western Front in 1917, where the Entente 
had longer attritional pockets. But at Gallipoli, where both battle and non-battle casualties 
were high, reinforcements were slow to arrive in-theatre, and units routinely went into action 
seriously understrength, the Allies simply could not afford to sustain this level of loss. 
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The operational conditions had important implications for the experience of the MEF’s 
soldiers. Too often they were committed by higher command to operations that were intended 
to achieve breakthroughs when such an outcome was never a realistic possibility. By the end 
of the campaign, units were undoubtedly more militarily effective at prosecuting trench 
warfare, and individual soldiers had become veterans. However, there is much evidence that 






The way that soldiers experienced the Gallipoli campaign was shaped by numerous factors. 
The agency of individuals, while not absent, was severely limited. This was in large part the 
consequence of an external factor, the chronic underestimation of the enemy by British 
strategic decision-makers, that ensured that the force sent to the Dardanelles was simply 
inadequate for the task. This was accompanied by poor, myopic planning. The failure to win 
a quick victory meant that the MEF had to cope with numerous challenges that helped to 
determine the nature of the soldiers’ experience at Gallipoli. This article has highlighted 
some of the most important: the environmental factors of climate and terrain; the military 
factor of tactical deadlock, which led to the creation of a trench system; sanitation and 
medical support; and the development of trench warfare and tactical and operational 
techniques. None of these factors was hermetically sealed. Rather, each factor was influenced 
by others. Thus the sanitation problem was exacerbated by the small size of the beachheads, 
which were in part a product of the failure of the initial assault to be converted into an 
operational success (which arguably was heavily influenced by faulty strategic decisions 
taken at the outset); and the subsequent emergence of tactual stalemate.  
 
Some factors were affected by others that have not been given much consideration here. The 
suffering of the Herefords as the result of the blizzard in November, for instance, was 
exacerbated by failures of leadership within the battalion. Thus there was a kind of negative 
symbiosis between various factors that helped to create the distinctive character of the 
Gallipoli campaign. This was in some ways similar to, but in others very different from the 
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‘flavour’ of other campaigns undertaken by British Empire soldiers in 1915, such as the 
Western Front or Mesopotamia.  
 
After the First World War, the Dardanelles expedition became the subject of a ‘heroic-
romantic myth’. 
110
 In reality, there was little that was romantic about the campaign for the 
men who served there. Gallipoli was the product of a set of circumstances that shaped a 
campaign that, even by the standards of the First World War, was for the participants an 
exceptionally unpleasant, dangerous, and gruelling experience. 
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